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The Deregulation of Industry: A Built-in Bias
DAVID S.

SCHWARTZ*

The question of deregulation of regulated industries and formulation of the problem as to the degree or direction of deregulation presupposes a course for public policy in only one direction. Any set of
policy choices, given the assumed objective of deregulation, precludes a
course of action that would strengthen and improve the regulatory
process as an institutional force. This paper seeks to examine and delineate meaningful regulatory reform which will pose a new set of
alternatives to refocus the regulatory process.
INTRODUCTION

An examination of the critics of regulation, and the climate in
which their criticism evolves, depicts disillusionment with regulators and
the results of current regulation. This temporal approach which focuses
on the status quo loses sight of the historical evolution of the public
utility concept. In addition, it fails to distinguish between regulation as
an institution and regulators as an instrument for social control. Dr.
Martin Glaeser in his discussion of the historical background of regulation, stresses the development of the public utility concept from Roman
times forward, and the rationale for government regulation of private
industry in the context of its social evolution.1
Specifically, he provides the historical roots for the distinction between a "just price" and the contemporaneous doctrine of "natural
(market) price" which Roman law had derived from stoic philosophy.
The underlying rationale for the "just price" doctrine resided in those
unique circumstances, such as shortages of necessary food, in which
coercion is possible in pricing unique necessities. In order to mitigate
the potential exploitation in "market forces" the early Church Fathers
developed the legitimacy of trading in which the producer (seller) priced
on the basis of the expenses associated with production, compensation
* Adjunct Professor of Economics, Michigan State University. The views and opinions
expressed in this statement are entirely personal and are submitted in an individual capacity.
Any opinions, findings, results, or conclusions are exclusively those of the author and do

not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. I am currently working 1on a NSF grant (RANN Program Grant No. SIA 74-22664) on regulatory reform.
See M. GIAEsER, PUBLIC UT-jms iN A.iEmacAN CAPiTALsM (1957).
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for risk, and the cost of storage. This buying and selling was viewed
as having common advantages to both parties, and the exchange at "just
2
prices" was distinguished from that fixed in the market.
The evolution of the public utility concept distinguished those businesses "affected with the public interest" from unregulated enterprise,
and underpinned the basic right of the public to goods and services at
just and reasonable prices. Before examining the criticisms of regulation, it is essential that this awareness of the regulated business as distinct from the unregulated enterprise, and the unique characteristics of
public utilities, be kept in mind in evaluating the desirability of total
reliance on market forces.
The attack on the regulatory agencies has come from a wide variety
of critics-the administration, the Congress, academics, business users,
and general consumers. The common denominator for the criticism is
the ever-increasing prices and the deterioration of service. The disparate
elements in the criticism reflect the self interests of the various critics.
The consumers see the regulators as captives of the industry and emphasize the failure to protect the consuming interests fronr escalating
prices and poor service. The broader criticisms of regulatory commissions concern the inflationary implications of commission activities, the
failure to deal with conservation and energy problems in a meaningful
manner, and the more general criticisms that regulators have been insensitive to environmental degradation and resource waste.
Undoubtedly there is some truth in all of these charges in the assessment of the current regulatory process. Nonetheless, does it justify, and
will the social condition be improved, if we discard the regulatory authority? In this regard it is essential that we separate the theory of
regulation and the performance of regulators. If the regulators have
failed to develop and implement the necessary social controls to protect
the public interest, then we must examine why they have failed, and reinforce and improve the regulatory process to overcome these failures.
In the highly idealized advocacy for reliance upon the market place, in
lieu of the regulatory authority, we have sublimated consideration of
the unique characteristics of the regulated industries-the potential exploitative power of monopoly firms that have been entrenched as "natural
monopolies."
The fundamental question still remains. What is the vitality of the
public utility concept today? To answer this question we must separate
the role of the regulator from the institutional alternatives for regula21d.at 195-20S.
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tion. Undoubtedly the deficiencies of current regulation reflect a failure
to accommodate to change. This is illustrated by the CAB prohibition
against charter flights which set prices lower than the scheduled airlines,
the trucking cartel, and the over-protection of the railroads by the ICC.
In addition, there is validity in the criticism of the regulators for failing
to curb monopoly power. Instead commissions have entrenched and concentrated economic power, as manifested in the FPC's failure to deal
with the small municipal systems equitable entry into pools, as well as
a tolerant policy toward mergers in the past. Lastly, the enforcement of
cartelization and legitimizing of monopoly power through the use of the
natural monopoly doctrine as a rationalization, has resulted in higher
prices, inefficient operation, and resource waste.
The remedy lies in two directions. We must insist that the regulators who are appointed to commissions recognize the regulatory agency
as a "social control" vehicle, and differentiate profit maximization standards from public interest standards. Unfortunately the tendency is for
regulatory commissions to define and resolve pricing and certificate
(licensing) decisions in the context of existing industry structure. The
second area for regulatory reform concerns the needed institutional
changes which will make regulatory commissions more responsive to
public policies which incorporate antitrust objectives.
Even in those regulated industries, such as transportation generally
and motor transport in particular, which are considered prime candidates
for deregulation there is the danger that firms can segment the market
and exploit the inelastic sector. This could result in higher prices and
poorer service (if not total discontinuance), than would be possible
under continued regulation. As Robert Harbeson, Emeritus Professor
of Transportation Economics at the University of Illinois, has pointed
out, when trucking was deregulated in Britain the average rate on truckloads dropped 20 percent, but the rates on less than truck loads increased
40 percent.'
Rather than posing the choices in terms of continuing the status quo
(ineffective regulation) or total reliance upon market forces (deregulation), in my view it is preferable to continue but drastically to restructure regulation. The analytical effort that follows will delineate the procedures in the regulated energy utilities (electric and gas) that can be
used as a guide in the development of public policy for continued regulation. The essential elements for strengthening regulation require a
sensitivity to the need for independent measures of performance of the
8 Economics of Commission Regulation, Nov. 24, 1975 (unpublished paper given at the
Library of Congress for the Joint Economic Committee).
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regulated firm and the potential for competition in discrete markets. The
use of organizational diversity, rivalry, and competitive interplay as a
regulatory variable can induce the regulated firms to lower prices, greater
efficiency, resource optimization, and technological innovation.
THE TEST FOR PUBLIC UTILITY STATUS

Dr. Glaeser has pointed to the "twilight zone" in which a business
at one time not "affected with the public interest" would move into the
context of a public utility, and contrariwise move out of "utility" status.
He has detailed the essential characteristics which proscribe the finn or
industry at a given point in time as "affected with the public interest."
When property is dedicated to public use, such as the "common calling"
under British common law, where innkeepers and wharfingers were determined to be businesses "affected with the public interest" they were
required to serve all comers at reasonable rates. Obviously the public
utility status is embedded in custom which grew out of common law.4
The historical test indicates the denial of public utility status for
certain businesses (such as ice and theatre tickets) by legislatures, courts,
or commissions, but extensions in other cases. This is true of the regulation over the price of milk5 and natural gas." The historical test for
public utility status is what Glaeser called a "fixed concept with changing content."
Additional characteristics such as the franchise test, that is, the use
of public streets and property, is another indication of public utility
status. This limited (exclusive) franchise is a means of control of entry
predicated on the assumption that duplication of firms or facilities would
be wasteful. In addition, to distinguish the public utility enterprise, the
service is usually considered necessary for life under modem conditions.
Finally, one of the most significant factors for public utility status
is the monopoly test. The assumption here is that unregulated businesses are adequately competitive, substitutes are available, and goods
and services are less essential than the regulated industries. The line of
cases delineating those monopoly businesses "affected with the public
interest" dates back to Munn v. Illinois.7 The "natural monopoly doctrine" postulates the need for a public authority to determine price in
industries that are subject to economies of scale, decreasing costs, and
can provide economic benefits from a single supplier. The complemen4

See M. GLAEmS,

EcoNomcs
5

supra note 1. See also M. GrAwsER, OuTms oF PUBLIc UTMnT

(1927).

Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
Phllips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).

7 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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tary argument is that excessive competition may result in loss or serious
deterioration of essential services. Lastly, there is an implicit conservation of resources in the prohibition of unnecessary, usually very large
capital investments, for two or more utility firms.
In the development of the public utility concept certain rights and
duties have been defined. The duties usually involve the obligation of
the utility to provide adequate service to all without discrimination at
reasonable rates. The rights have included eminent domain, the privilege
of the exclusive franchise, and adequate compensation for rendering
service. These are the benchmarks of public utility status and the historical and conceptual rationale for services that are "quasi-social goods."
REGULATORY REFORM

Independent Performance Measures and Refocusing
Regulatory Objectives
Regulatory commissions conceive of ratemaking in the context of
cost-of-service and a rate base framework. The policies that have been
designed to determine prudent costs essentially reflect an effort to assure
full coverage and a fair rate of return. This cost-plus approach provides
very little incentive for efficient and optimal use of resources. The corollary is disincentives for seeking lowest cost (price) levels of operation.
Regulatory commissions must free themselves from the revenue requirement approach which primarily underpins the expectancies of the monopoly firm and insulates the firm from risk. Regulatory commissions
can accomplish this by opening regulated markets to competition, and by
developing independent measures of performance.
The regulated firm will seek to eliminate uncertainty by using the
political process to influence the appointment of commissioners sympathetic towards the objectives of the firm as a profit maximizer. In addition it will seek to restrict entry (territorial exclusivity) and to pursue
those procedures which will insulate the firm against uncertainty.
An examination of the recent modifications in the traditional cost
of service rate base regulatory framework indicates a marked and overriding predisposition on the part of regulatory commissions to insulate
the regulated firm from risk and to reinforce the monopoly power of the
regulated firm. An examination of the changes in the revenue requirement practices reflects the entrenchment of the regulated firm by using
the following regulatory procedures:
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1. The tendency to use the projected (future) test year instead of
the historical test year which in a period of inflation biases rates
upward.
2. The shift to year-end rate base instead of average rate base which
biases rates upward.
3. The inclusion of construction work in progress in the rate base instead of capitalizing the interest on funds used during construction, which biases rates upward.
4. The adoption of the fuel adjustment clause, and in at least one
instance an indexing approach for other automatic adjustments,
which has the tendency to bias rates upwards.
5. The current concern with the difficulties of electric utilities to raise
capital (which in fact may reflect inefficient management and lax
regulation) has resulted in significant increases in the allowed rates
of return on investment above previous levels. In fact, increases
which may not be associated with the attendant risks of utility
operation.
These distortions in the regulatory process reflect a shift of business and operating risk from the firm to the consumer and embody a
built-in predisposition towards higher prices. In addition, there are a
wide range of financial programs advocating public subsidies relative to
tax reductions through special concessions such as increasing the investment tax credit, and government guarantees underwriting utility debt
and other assurances of low cost capital.
To escape the fixed framework of past regulatory distortions there
is a need for the regulatory commissions to sense the importance of
independent measures of performance. This will permit an objective
basis for regulatory review of a cost of service and rate base presentation that can be evaluated in terms of improved efficiency over time of
the firm, as well as a comparison of performance with similar firms in
the industry.
In this regard the Office of Economics of the FPC developed a
number of statistical indicators to measure the performance of private
electric companies in the years 1963-70.' This data permitted intercompany comparisons as well as year-to-year changes for more than
200 private electric companies. The study consisted of 17 classification
items and 20 operating and financial ratios to permit an evaluation of
cost trends and cost comparisons.
Building on the earlier FPC study, the National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners, reacting to rising electric bills and
SF

Powim CommssioN, PmmoRmxc
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concern about the performance of the electric industry, developed the
so-called "red flagged" approach to the analysis of utility efficiency.9
The National Association of State and Federal Regulatory Commissions
in sponsoring the study sensed the importance of pressuring regulated
firms to levels of efficiency by independent comparisons. In the introduction of the study the point is made that electric utilities function as
monopolies, and questioned whether there are adequate incentives for
these firms to operate at maximum efficiency.
The "red flagged" approach rated the top 25 percent and the bottom
25 percent of electric companies in each of 8 of the 22 performance categories. The eight categories used were those under the control of the
individual company managements and their performance was evaluated
on the basis of the following:
1. Capacity utilization;
2. heat rate;

3.
4.
S.
6.

production expense per Kwh generated;
net utility plant investment per Kwh sold;
total operating expense per Kwh sold;
total operating expenses per Kwh sold (excluding federal, state and.
local taxes, cost of fuel and purchased power);
7. total operating expense per Kwh sold (excluding federal, state and
local taxes); and
8. productivity of labor, annual Kwh Sales per employee.
The statistical data on the remaining 14 categories are provided for each
company but is not used for comparison purposes because these factors
are beyond the control of the individual company managements.
It is essential that regulatory commissions go beyond the use of
these rudimentary tools to measure performance in order to refocus the
regulatory process beyond the cost of service-revenue requirement context of today's decisionmaking. External information is critical to evaluate the regulated firm's performance and to provide regulators with the
basis for insisting upon improvements in those circumstances where they
are warranted. Undoubtedly more sophisticated quantitative techniques
can be developed in the future to measure cost and production functions
of the regulated firms. These will provide additional independent measures for comparisons, and permit regulators to objectively monitor performance of the individual firms.
In lieu of the protective procedures which shift the operating and
financial risk of the firm to the consuming public and the ensuing un9 NARUC,

THE MEAsuRE oF ELFCR

UTInry Eimcmscy (1975).
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reasonable higher prices, performance yardsticks can move commission
activity closer to the public interest standards of a social control mechanism in redefining the regulatory role. The discussion of market structure changes and the use of a competitive regulatory variable that will
be developed subsequently should be considered in conjunction with the
previous discussion concerning the perfection of independent performance measures to promote efficiency on the part of regulated firms by
regulatory commissions.
ANTITRUST AND PRICING IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITIES INDUSTRIES

A review of recent court decisions indicates that the courts symmetrically interrelate the antitrust statutes and regulatory objectives.
Since the El Paso case,' 0 where the Supreme Court found that the acquisition of Pacific Northwest Pipeline was in violation of Section 7 of
the Clayton Act," the objectives of removing antitrust violations and
the regulatory determination of public convenience and necessity under
certification authority have been joined. As we will see, the courts have
prodded commissions to remove anticompetitive conditions and provide
opportunities for developing competitive interplay in the regulated electric and natural gas markets.
An examination of the potential for competition, when we look beyond local markets (residential service), indicates a wide range of competitive opportunities for wholesale and industrial sales which can be
opened to competition among the regulated electric utilities. It is important that regulatory commissions promote competition as a complementary force to induce improved performance and to provide an environment conducive to greater efficiency and lower prices. Instead of
commissions seeking to limit the areas of competition in these discrete
markets they should encourage rivalry and competitive interplay.
For years the wholesale tariffs filed by larger private electric companies with the Federal Power Commission contained provisions which
were restrictive in their pricing terms and conditions. These tariffs prohibited "full requirements" customers from obtaining power from other
utilities. In addition, these tariffs contained provisions prohibiting the
purchasers, usually municipal systems, from reselling that power. In
effect, this precluded the possibility that the purchasing municipal system
would compete for industrial load. It was only the vigorous efforts of
various municipal systems that forced Boston Edison' 2 to remove these
10 California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
"15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
12See Municipal Light Bds. v. Boston Edison Co., 45 F.P.C. 1047 (1971); Municipal
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restrictions by threatening, and actually pursuing various suits in the
courts, that provided for the ultimate modification and removal of these
onerous terms.
Again, the question of market foreclosure arose in a proceeding
involving the cities of Anaheim and Riverside, California which were
tied to "full requirements" by the Southern California Edison Company.13 Ultimately these restrictions were removed on the basis of settlement of the parties, but the FPC did not in this instance, as in the
others, play an important role in removing these restrictive provisions.
An allied issue concerning the "price-squeeze" allegation made by
more than half-a-dozen municipalities before the FPC relates to the
larger private systems' practice of filing wholesale rates at levels equal
to or greater than the same private utility charges industrial customers.
The FPC took the position that it did not have jurisdiction over retail
(industrial) rates and therefore could not consider the "price-squeeze"
issue.' 4
In a recent court decision: 5 the District Court of Appeals held that
the Commission should evaluate the wholesale rate with a sensitivity to
the industrial rate level, and while setting the wholesale rate within the
zone of reasonableness it should attempt to modify any anticompetitive
implications.
Specifically, the court said:
Petitioners do not ask the FPC to modify or to authorize the modification of retail rates. They have only asked that the interstate rate inor reduced if the anticompetitive
crease proposed by AP&L be rejected
1
allegations are found to have merit. '
It is clear that the court viewed as an important consideration for the
FPC determination of wholesale rates the "price-squeeze" implications
in setting rates within its regulatory ambit: The court pointed out that
the "Federal Power Act does not contemplate that the Commission is
to operate in an airtight chamber, insulated from non-jurisdictional factors."'

7

In directing the Commission's attention to the importance of

competition in the electric wholesale market, the court noted that: "The
electric power wholesaler may in fact be seeking to put the retailer out
of business."' Lastly, the court explicitly charged the Commission with
Lights Bds. v. Boston Edison Co., 45 F.P.C. 227 (1971). See also Boston Edison Co., 50
F.P.C. 557 (1973).
'.Southern Calif. Edison Co., 49 F.P.C. 717, 718 (1973).
141d. at 720-22.
5 Conway Corp. v. FPC, 510 F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
16 ld. at 1271 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
17 Id. at 1272.
18 Id. at 1269 n.6.
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the consideration of anticompetitive effects of the regulated aspects of
interstate utility operations, and concluded:
On the issue before us, we see a statute that confers plenary jurisdiction to review the interstate wholesale rate and to provide relief
addressed to such wholesale rate in order to further the public interest.
The Commission has latitude to address the matter in consultation
with, and after joint hearings with, the state commission. But it cannot wash its hands of the public interest problem as one totally beyond
its jurisdiction.19
In the decision on a petition by a number of California cities seeking review of a decision by the California Public Utilities Commission
granting a certificate to the Pacific Gas and Electric Company to obtain
power from geothermal steam sites in Northern California, the court
again emphasized the need to consider antitrust implications in evaluating the public convenience and necessity.' The court held that a close
nexus existed between the antitrust allegations raised by the Northern
California Power Agency (Cities) and the application for a certificate
to construct facilities and to exclude the California cities from participation. The court concluded that the Commission could not ignore antitrust factors on the grounds that they were collateral to the issue of
public convenience and necessity.
In a precedent-setting case, the cities of Lafayette and Plaquemine,
Louisiana, challenged a routine request by the Gulf State Utilities Company for approval of the issuance of debt securities under Section 204
of the Federal Power Act. The cities raised a number of unique questions concerning the prospective use of the funds by Gulf States to
further alleged anticompetitive interconnections and pooling arrangements with other private companies which they contended would preclude competition to the detriment of the cities."The FPC had refused to hear the complaint, and ruled, in a narrow
context, that the financing terms and conditions met the requirements of
Section 204 and that the complaint was not germane to the requirements
under the Act. In effect, the Commission ruled that the question of the
use of the funds, and the related activities, was beyond the scope of
security approval.22
The Supreme Court ultimately reversed, remanding the case to the
Commission and ruling that it must consider the antitrust and anticom19 Id.at 1272.
20
Northern Calif. Power Agency v. California Pub. Util. Comm., 5 Cal. 3d 370, 486
P.2d21218, 96 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1971).
1Cities of Lafayette & Plaquemine v. Gulf States Util. Co., 44 F.P.C. 1524 (1970).
22
1d. at 1525-26.
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petitive issues. The Court stressed that the Commission should serve as
the "first line of defense" against those practices that might later be in
violation of the antitrust laws. The Court emphasized that the sensitivity to antitrust implication was particularly important in reviewing
and approving security issues under Section 204, because at this incipient
stage potential complex transactions that could ensue in the future could
be avoided.Y3
24
In this regard, the earlier mentioned El Paso
case should have
prompted the FPC to foresee the difficulties of permitting an anticompetitive arrangement which ultimately would be overturned by the courts.
The Justice Department as early as 1958 had requested the FPC to delay
any review of El Paso's proposed merger with Pacific Northwest until
the completion of the antitrust suit which Justice had commenced in
1957.25 The failure to do so necessitated 13 years of agonizing effort to
accomplish divestiture, and a needless waste of time and money in complex transactions that were consummated after the merger had been
approved by the Commission.2"

In City of Parisv. Kentucky Utility Co.,27 the Commission refused
to order Kentucky Utility Company to transport power from a co-op to
the city. At the time Kentucky Utilities was the sole supplier of the city
of Paris. The power offered by the co-op was at lower rates and would
have provided part of the city's requirements, but it would in addition
have broken Kentucky Utility's exclusive hold as sole supplier. This
would have injected competition for future load growth of the city. The
FPC, with its usual perception, again served the interests of the large
private firm and failed to sense the importance of promoting competition
in this market.
This same perceptiveness was reflected in Otter Tail Power v.
United States. 28 The Commission had initially refused to order Otter
Tail to wheel Bureau of Reclamation power to the Village of Elbow
Lake, Minnesota. The FPC, as in City of Paris, concluded that as a
matter of law they could not compel Otter Tail to transport power for
23

Gulf States Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 757-62 (1973).

24

California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962). See note 10 supra & text accompanying.
r The FPC had ignored a similar request by the California Attorney General's office,
20 F.P.C. 357 (1958).
2
See, e.g., California-Pacific Util. Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 962 (1973); Utah
Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas, 395 U.S. 464 (1969); Cascade Natural Gas
Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967); United States v. El Paso Natural
2

Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).

27 38 F.P.C. 269 (1967); City of Paris v. Kentucky Util. Co., 44 F.P.C. 45 (1969).
28410 U.S. 366 (1973).
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Elbow Lake.29 The District Court's remand of this decision to the Commission pointed out that Otter Tail's activities constituted illegal monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: the refusal to sell
(once the FPC had ordered Otter Tail to interconnect its system with
Elbow Lake) or wheel power to the municipal system was a violation of
the antitrust statute. More importantly, the court stressed-almost as
an object lesson-that the antitrust statutes do apply to the electric utilities industry."0 The District Court analysis was ultimately affirmed by
the United States Supreme Court."'
This landmark decision has two important implications. First, it
squarely joins the application of the antitrust laws to the regulated electric utilities. Secondly, at a minimum it encourages, if not mandates,
that the FPC foster competition in the regulated utilities. It is critical
that the FPC take this important opportunity to promote competition,
and that it acknowledge the broad benefits in pricing and performance
to be obtained from a more flexible market structure. In this regard,
the Commission must resist the current efforts by Otter Tail to exact
an unreasonable rate for the wheeling of the power to Elbow Lake. If
this pricing strategy succeeds, it will undoubtedly frustrate the benefits
from wheeling, and undermine the prospects for competition and lower
prices to ultimate consumers.
If the Federal Power Commission and state commissions are to
promote a greater range of competitive pricing options in the wholesale
and retail markets, it is essential that smaller private and municipal systems have access to a wider range of low cost bulk power. In hearings
before the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Atomic Energy
Commission (Nuclear Regulatory Commission), and the Federal Power
Commission there are numerous instances documenting the restrictive
practices of the larger private electric systems in refusing to interconnect with smaller systems, wheel power, or sell economy power to
the smaller systems.
One example of the problem of small private and municipal systems having access to low cost bulk power is the determination by the
Securities and Exchange Commission not to evaluate the antitrust allegations raised by a number of municipal systems relative to exclusion
from two nuclear power projects in New England. In the remand of the
case to the SEC the Supreme Court indicated that the Commission had
29

However, the Commission did order a temporary interconnection, 40 F.P.C. 1262
(1968) and later a permanent one, 46 F.P.C. 675 (1971).
30331 F. Supp. 54, 61-64 (D. Minn. 1971).
81410 U.S. at 372-75.
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too narrowly framed the question of approval of the issuance of securities in the establishment of a separate corporation for the Vermont
Yankee and Maine Yankee Projects. 2
The court held that the SEC was required to look beyond the question of control by the individual participants in the nuclear projects.
Further, the Commission was obligated to look beyond the Public Utility
Company Holding Act and to review the evidence concerning the antitrust allegations made by the municipal systems relative to exclusion
from participating in ownership of the nuclear facilities. The Court
stressed that concentration and control by the large private systems- over
low cost nuclear power could have anticompetitive effects, and the prohibition of municipal participation would effectively block them from
low cost power and preclude effective competition in the future.'
The SEC had requested a review of the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals' decision that the Commission must take into account the
policy underlying the Clayton Act in deciding whether or not to approve the stock acquisition arrangements for the new nuclear corporations. The Court of Appeals explicitly stated that the statute required
the Commission to take into account the policies underlying the Clayton
Act in the approval of the stock arrangement. 4
The general question of access to low cost bulk power, and the implications for a more competitive wholesale and retail market, underlies the review by the Justice Department of applications for nuclear
licenses before the Nuclear Regulatory Agency. Section 105 (c) of the
Atomic Energy Act35 requires the Attorney General to determine whether
any activities under the license would create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws. The intervention by the Justice Department, and the review of license applications recommending a hearing, reflects a broad interpretation seeking the removal of all anticompetitive restraints by the private utility seeking a nuclear license. The
Justice Department has argued that the utility must not only provide
access to the new nuclear units, but must also remove all constraints on
interconnection and coordination, wheeling, and access to other supply
alternatives. 8
Another ramification of the general problem of access to low cost
bulk power supply concerns the exclusion of, or onerous terms for, the
82 SEC v. New England Elec. Sys., 384 U.S. 176 (1966).
83 Id. at 183-84.
34 Municipal Elec. Ass'n v. SEC, 413 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
85
3

42

U.S.C. § 2135(c) (1970).

6 Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n
Docket Nos. 50-329A, 50-3302.
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smaller system with regard to power pools. During the 1960's, when
power pools expanded and new pools were organized to achieve greater
reliability and lower cost power for the major private electric utilities,
the majority of the pools denied entry to small private and municipal
systems. This practice of limiting membership to the larger private electrics, for example the New England Power Pool, was subsequently modified and some of the new pooling agreements admitted smaller private
and municipal systems to membership. The terms usually reflected a
continuation of control in the larger private systems. (This is not to
suggest that all prohibitions have been removed relative to entry by
municipals or small private systems.)
The essential problem--dominance by the larger private companies
of the power pools and their preferential access to low cost power from
pools-still remains. While these modifications, and the acceptance of
the smaller systems into pooling arrangements are important steps, it is
essential that regulatory policies be designed to make power pools more
democratic in terms of control, and that the discriminatory or preferential terms in the various power pooling agreements be changed to provide uniform benefits and costs to all members.
Lastly, the allocation of exclusive territory for business operation
would be considered illegal in the unregulated industries, but the exclusive franchise is accepted as a matter of course in the electric utility
industry. There appears to be a failure to delineate the justification in
residential markets, as distinct from industrial and wholesale markets,
for exclusive territorial operation. Recently the Justice Department obtained a settlement by consent decree and eliminated the territorial restrictions on the sale of bulk electric power which had been entered into
between Florida Power Corporation and Tampa Electric Company. The
settlement removed restrictions on the wholesale sale of power to the
cities of Bartow and Sebring, Florida, by which the two private companies had agreed not to sell in each other's territory. The consent decree prohibited the private companies from allocating or imposing restrictions on the customers or territories in which each would market
bulk power for resale. It is important to note that the attack on territorial division in the sale of wholesale power was pursued by the Justice
Department, and not by the Federal Power Commission. 7 In a case involving the city of Gainesville, Florida, the FPC again avoided the
question of territorial exclusivity by refusing to examine the contention
by the city that it had the right to extend service to a suburban area
ST U.S.v. Florida Power Corp., 1971 Trade Cases U73637.
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which the Florida Power Corporation contended was covered by its
franchise 8
ANTITRUST AND PIPELINE REGULATION

In the landmark El Paso9 case the Supreme Court determined that
the evidence of antitrust violations is relevant under the Natural Gas
Act, and is particularly so in regard to the standard relating to "public
convenience and necessity." The ultimate culmination and the divestiture of the Pacific Northwest Pipeline properties by El Paso required
more than 13 years to accomplish after the initial merger was approved
by the FPC in 1959. The Court found that the merger violated the
Clayton Act and stressed that it significantly reduced competition in
California and the Northwest generally. It is ironic that at the final
stages of the lengthy litigation the FPC supported the application of an
existing pipeline, Colorado Interstate Gas Company, and failed to agree
with one section of its staff supporting a new entrant which would have
the potential of promoting interpipeline competition.
In the precedent-making court test of Lynchburg Gas Co. v.
FPC,40 the company requested a review of the FPC's procedure in authorizing a new rate schedule by the Atlantic Seaboard Corporation (a
pipeline affiliate of the Columbia Gas system). The schedule provided
for higher rates for resale customers who obtained less than their full
requirements' from Seaboard. The petitioner contended that the approval of the partial requirements distinction created an unreasonable
restraint upon trade and was discriminatory and in violation of the antitrust laws as well as Section 5 (a) of the Natural Gas Act.
The court determined that the Commission's approval of the partial requirements status and payment for natural gas, even if not actually
used, was not supported by findings based on the record. More importantly, the court emphasized that while the FPC was not responsible for
enforcement of the antitrust laws, it must consider the intent of those
laws in the context of public convenience and necessity of Section 7
proceedings under the Natural Gas Act. In remanding the case to the
Commission, the court stressed that it was obligated to consider whether
the rate foreclosure or the tendency to foreclose competition by the
full requirements provision would place a discriminatory burden on the
customer. 4 '
88 City of Gainesville v. Florida Power Corp., 40 F.P.C. 1226 (1968).
89 California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).

40 336 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
41 Id. at 946-47.

19761

DEREGULATION OF INDUSTRY

In Northern Natural Gas v. FPC4 (the Great Lakes case) the District of Columbia Court of Appeals remanded the case to the FPC and
criticized the Commission for failure to review the antitrust implications when they certified the Great Lakes project permitting the American Natural Gas Company a 50 percent interest in the new line. The
court emphasized that the joint venture (between Trans-Canada Pipeline and American Natural) could have substantial anticompetitive effects
on the marketing of gas in Michigan and Wisconsin. The lengthy court
analysis of the concentration in the Michigan and Wisconsin markets
and the "tight" oligopoly manifest in American Natural's dominance in
the Michigan market was underscored in the opinion. The court criticized the Commission for ignoring the potential benefits of increased
competition, and posed as an alternative to the FPC decision the requirement that American Natural divest itself of ownership in the Great
Lakes line.43
The remand of the case to the Commission suggested that if extenuating circumstances were found, then the corporate relationships
could be continued as a counterweight to the anticompetitive implications. 4 The Commission subsequently delineated the special circumstances which were postulated as "extenuating" to underpin their original
certification.4 5 Unfortunately, the Justice Department did not appeal the
Commission decision and clearly force a definitive determination as to
whether the antitrust statutes are overriding and require a conformity
by the regulatory bodies.
CONCLUSION

This discussion of regulatory reform has articulated a middle
ground between continuing the regulatory status quo and exclusive reliance on market forces. This "third choice" reflects the need to reorient regulatory objectives so that commissions define their role as the
implementation of social control of business. This requires the formulation of public interest standards with clear and unambiguous differentiation from the objectives of the regulated firm.
One of the areas which most urgently requires public policy formulation is the refinement of independent performance measures to determine the comparative efficiency of the regulated firm, as well as the
monitoring of performance of the individual firm over time. In addi42 339 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
4
31d. at 959-71.
441d. at 977.
45 44 F.P.C. 21 (1970).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51;718

tion, potential competition in discrete markets and submarkets suggests
significant benefits for the regulatory process and provides the opportunity for inducing improved performance of the regulated firm with
the attendant benefits to the consuming public.
Past commission action seemingly has postulated the objectives of
regulation with an insensitivity to the antitrust statutes. The courts have
continually attempted to broaden the objectives of regulation and have
emphasized the need to conceive of public interest alternatives in the
light of the antitrust laws. Past regulatory decisions by the FPC in the
electric power and natural gas industries reflect various facets of market
foreclosure, refusal to deal, entry restrictions, and a wide range of anticompetitive arrangements. It is necessary for commissions to open up
market opportunities in the regulated industries and to sense the benefits to the overall consuming public of removing anticompetitive blockages that have existed in the past.
It is essential that regulatory commissions acknowledge the potentially broad public benefits of promoting the rivalry and competitive
interplay which offer the promise of superior performance by firms in
the regulated industry paralleling the same expectancies that exist in the
unregulated sector. By subjecting the regulated firm to greater competition, the potential for greater efficiency, innovation, and more rational
resource use will be achieved. It is critical that the regulatory commissions promote competition, and realize that the antitrust laws do apply
to regulated industries.

